Well, we don't know that now, do we? I mean, we just don't know how long that survivor will live. And, in some respects, it's a roll of the dice. In addition to which, isn't it fair to say that if you took the lump sum, you'd also be able to earn interest on it? I mean, you could invest it. There are other things you could do with it. I just -- I don't think this record ought to reflect a bias. And I regard the testimony that the lump sum is not worth what the payments are to be a bias, because we don't know what the payments will amount to. A person could 315 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 live for one month, a person could live for six months, a person could live for three years or ten years. You just don't know. Is that fair?
Well, your argument wants to suggest that the survivor lives a very short time; and our argument suggests that the survivor lives a longer time. The actuarial tables can tell you what the projected life of the survivor will be. So, I mean -- it's not generally -- and every year, it gets longer and longer.
Well, I understand you use actuarial tables for a bunch of purposes. But for purposes of this hearing, we do not know how long any individual survivor will last; and, therefore, it's a matter of choice on the survivor whether or not to take a lump sum.
I couldn't tell you off the top of my head. Every year, it gets longer. The life of our retirees and survivors gets longer every year, we all know that. And what the danger is, if you just get the death benefit, you will run out of money 316 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 before run out of the life. With the pension and the survivorship, you will have the benefit until the survivor dies. That is a tremendous value compared to the death benefit.
I understand that, I understand that. But you still can't conclude one thing or the other. It's still a matter of probability.
And the probability every year is that the survivor will live longer.
Well, all of us are, hopefully, living longer and healthier.
And we would like to have them have a benefit every month up until the time they die.
What I would like to 317 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 do is recognize Councilman Ortiz for a clarifying point, and then I'd like to take a recess.
Excuse me. I'll announce the length of time of the recess.
I just want to make the point that in terms for the purposes of this legislation, when we speak about family, that a life partner becomes part of that family. So that if he's designated as such, you're not eliminating the aunts, uncles because, obviously, the purpose of this amendment is to make it possible for a life partner to be able to get the pension. And so life partner becomes added, and the term "family" is in essence broadened to include that.
I have to tell you -- I have to tell you, it is my understanding that everything that you just said is basically 318 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 not true, and that "life partner" isn't mentioned in the pension ordinance, and that the only thing that the amendment does is to allow a person to name -- it adds to the list of names of anybody so that you can list all those other people.
But that has -- but "life partner" isn't in the pension bill.
I understand that. But in your presentation, you were saying that if this pension allows the elimination of the family,. Well, the individual can designate --
-- can designate the family. And at this time, your life partner can't be part of that family designation, so that a life partner can't be --
That's a very confusing statement, Councilman. That's inconsistent with what it is that's in the bill, and I'm afraid to let it go unchallenged because somebody will think that now life partners, the so-called life partner or domestic partner is in the list of people that are now eligible to 319 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 receive the survivorship rights, and that's not true. Councilman Nutter has explained that this bill only amends the bill so as to provide that the pensioner can now leave the survivor benefits to anybody else.
No, doesn't say "life partner." It's just anyone in addition to all of the other people that he has previously been eligible. Councilman Nutter.
Thank you, Mr. President. The primary purpose of this particular bill is to allow a public employee to give his or her earned pension to any person that they decide, outside of a now-constrained universe of people, spouse, children, dependent children, anyone else the person becomes responsible for, anyone that they are related to by blood or marriage. There is no distinction made in this amendment as to who that person may be, what the 320 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 nature of their relationship may be or anything else. It does not ask, it does not require. It only asks the person to designate someone. It could be anyone. It could be a next-door neighbor, it could be an old army buddy, it could be a person that -- well, it's not going to be Councilman Kenney, but it could be anybody that the person wishes to choose because some employees feel either constrained by the present list of designees, or, for some other reason, don't want to put down or can't put down the current list that is available. And that is the sum and substance of this particular bill. It does not make any definition or require you -- anyone to meet any particular test at all. It could include anyone. You and Councilman Ortiz at some level are saying similar things, different things. Anyone would qualify, under this particular bill.
That's right, but it's a little bit deceptive to say the life partner is now a part of the family because someone might erroneously conclude that the order 321 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 of family relationships that is already contained in the pension ordinance is now somehow supplemented with life partner. That's not in it.
It is not changed by life partner designation. The pension Board would not ask, it is not required, it does not show up anywhere. I mean I believe that this bill, quite frankly, had it been introduced at any other particular point in time, would not be the subject of much of the discussion that has taken place around it as a result of other bills, but that was that decision. The legislation says any other person as designated by the employee, period. No 17 qualifiers, no family person is put in a lesser position as a result of this particular amendment. There is no guarantee that the employee today, under the current pension system, will choose any particular person, but they are restrained from choosing people outside of the list.
That's true. Councilman, I would like at this time for this 322 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 Committee to stand in recess until the 6:30. This Committee will stand in recess till 6:30. And we will need the City witnesses back at this time. (Recess taken at 5:44 p.m.) (Proceedings resume.)
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. This is a recessed hearing the Council Committee of the Whole. We are taking testimony on three bills: Bill No. 970745, 970749, and 970750. At this time, I'd like to ask that the City witnesses resume the witness table. (City witnesses come forward.)
Is the City Solicitor available? The Chair recognizes Councilman Nutter.
Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, when we ended the hearing before the break, we were having -- or, I believe, finishing up a discussion about Bill No. 23 970745, which, of the three bills, one would think would be the least controversial and the easiest understood. It has also the simplest amendment. 323 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 I want to make sure that the record is clear and that there is no lingering confusion about the intention of Bill No. 970745. Again, the amendment to this bill would read, "any other person as designated by the employee." And I'd like to go back, if at all possible, either to the pension people or possibly to the City Solicitor to make sure that all Members are clear that this bill creates no other distinction or definition or category for this any other person as designated by the employee. I'd like to make sure that this part of the record is a clear as the earlier part of the record was and then possibly became confused. Mr. Hayllar, the amendment to Bill 17 970745 creates a new category called "any other person that's designate by the employee." Is that correct.
And is there any distinction or definition created to identify who that person is, could be, would be, may be, or can be, under any circumstance?
No. It's a person chosen 324 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 by the participant, as their survivor.
And could this amendment provide the public employee who, by right and by their work, create a circumstance for that employee to give his or her pension to any individual they decide?
And under the present pension ordinance, that employee now has a right to give his or her pension to any person they determine as long as they are on a list that is contained within the Pension Code that lays out generally spouse, child or children, other dependents, or any person related to them by blood or marriage. Is that correct?
I didn't hear the question the same way you did. We heard it differently.
The current pension ordinance allows an employee to name anyone related to them by blood or marriage as a beneficiary.
And they are -- they must stay within that group of people today? 325 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750
And they are not required to give any particular individual who fits that definition their pension today?
A public employee can give his or pension to anyone on that list of people, but they are not required to give it to any particular person on that list.
Okay, thank you. On that bill, yes, Mr. President, I'm finished.
So if the bill 24 passes as amended, anybody who now designates a pension survivor -- a person other than people who 326 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 are on the list will be taking a family member off and putting someone else on.
You have the ability now to name a brother instead of a spouse.
So that there could be a situation where people now have family members who are their survivors. If the bill 12 passes, they can take those family members off and they can put non-families on to get their survivor benefits.
The difference is that they can take a family member off now and replace it with another family member -- a cousin, a--
Mr. Hayllar, I don't need you to rephrase my question. I just need you to answer my question, I just need you to answer my question.
I can ask my own clarifying questions. I just need you to answer 327 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 my questions. And the fact of matter that if this bill passes with the amendments, there will be people who will now have the opportunity and the right to take family members off, they could take a spouse off, they could take dependent children off, they could take cousins and nephews off, and they could put non-family members on. They cannot now do that.
The answer is yes, much as they can now by moving one family member to another.
All right, thank you. To the City Solicitor, what's the legal issue raised by our changing these -- the right to change the beneficiaries, to give -- to add additional survivors to the list of people that are eligible to get these rights?
For the record, this is Stephanie Franklin-Suber, City Solicitor. As I understand your question, Mr. President, please correct me if I'm wrong, you are asking if there's a legal reason -- 328 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750
Are there any legal issues raised by the potential adoption of this bill as amended, as proposed to be amended?
Mr. President, I have formal testimony available for Members of Council, if you like for me to distribute it. But the short answer to your question is that I see no legal reason why Council may not extend the class of pension beneficiaries to any person. Frankly, I think this broad approach avoids any issues that might be raised if only life partners were added to the list of beneficiaries. I also understand that there's been some concern with regard to the fact that the bill 18 will somehow divest spouses and children of existing rights. I believe --
I believe that has been covered. The only other legal issue that I would bring to Council's attention at this point would 329 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 be with respect to labor issues and possible implementation delay. The City may have an obligation to bargain with unions representing City employees before it can implement bill since it impacts on pension rights, which are a term and condition of employment. However, this would not preclude Council from enacting the bill.
Is there any other Councilmember that has any other question at this time? (No questions from other Councilmembers at this time.)
I would like for you to turn your attention to -- and I would like to make some references to the legal opinion that was issued to me, dated April 21, 1998. And I'd like for all of to us turn our attention -- do the members of the press have copies of this opinion? (Members of the press respond in the affirmative.)
Let's turn our 330 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 attention to . And at the bottom under deficiencies and definition life partners, there's a sentence that says since the definition of life partners is limited to same-sex couples only and an opposite-sex unmarried couple could challenge this bill, Bill 970750, as a violation of a constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws. Then you say, however, the bill may be defensible, although it's a novel issue, and it's impossible to predict the outcome of any legal action. And I guess what I'd like for you to do -- it is my understanding, for example, that whereas the bill -- this bill provides, you know, same-sex benefits for life partners, those life partners have to be same sex, of course. And that it is possible that heterosexual life partners will go down and attempt to register and try to get the benefits. They would not be eligible for the benefits under the bill, and they could file -- they could challenge the bill? Is that correct?
Yes. 331 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750
Can you tell us what would happen if such a challenge -- I mean, roughly, what would happen? Although some of it is covered in the opinion. Who would make a determination that whether or not Bill 970750 and its application only to same-sex domestic partners was a violation of the bill and, therefore, could the Human Relations Commission or some other entity order domestic partnerships or same-sex partnership rights to opposite-sex domestic partners?
Mr. President, in response to your question, it would be up to the Human Relations Commission, and ultimately the courts, to determine whether or not there -- any of the employment practices are discriminatory on the part of a private employer.
I'm not talking about a private -- well, maybe I am talking about a private employer.
Mr. President, I apologize. I'm not following your question. If you could repeat it, please, I'll try to respond. You were on the Fair Practices Ordinance 332 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 Amendment.
-- life partners are now entitled to the rights under the bill to get the health benefits.
Some opposite-sex domestic partnership or a person who is in an opposite-sex domestic partnerships says, Oh, this is -- I can't -- they go down and they register, they try to register, they to make application for the benefits. They get denied. You know, the personnel department, whoever has to do it, says, No, you're an opposite-sex unmarried couple and you got a domestic partnership, you're not covered. An appeal is taken to the Human Relations Commission, is that correct? 333 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750
Well, Mr. President, a couple of things could happen. First of all -- which is why I apologize for my confusion at your original question. In terms of a potential equal protection challenge, certainly that would be before the courts. And an unmarried opposite-sex couple could certainly challenge the bill as a violation of the Constitutional rights under --
I want to know if they would have to go to the Human Relations Commission first.
For an equal protection challenge? If it's an equal protection challenge, not necessarily. But for a claim of discrimination on the basis of marital status, which is a possibility, the couple would file a complaint with Human Relations Commission. And it would be up to the Commission to interpret the ordinance 22 and to determine full scope of what is meant by discrimination on the basis of marital status.
But would the Human Relations Commission have the discretion to say 334 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 it's discrimination and the City must give the same-sex benefits to opposite-sex couples under the ordinance?
Yes. The Human Relations Commission could make a determination that there was, in fact, discrimination on the basis of marital status. It could issue an order directing an employer to pay the benefits.
Yes. That order could then be appealed to Common Pleas Court.
The lawyer. If, in that case, it's the City, the City. The City could then appeal to Common Pleas Court and --
Now, let me get straight. City Council passes a bill, the Mayor signs the bill, somebody tries to get benefits under the bill, appeals to the Human Relations Committee -- Commission, which is the City. And then the Human Relations 335 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 Commission, all of whom are appointed by the Mayor, would say, We think that the benefits should be given to heterosexual couples. And then the City is going to take an appeal from its order granting the benefits?
Mr. President, I am answering your question by saying that it certainly could happen, that is correct. In theory, the Human Relations Commission could, in fact, determine, based on its interpretation of the ordinance that there's been discrimination on the basis of marital status.
I accept that. So the Human Relations Commission orders heterosexual couples to have these rights.
Well, the Commission would be acting on that particular complaint involving those parties.
I understand that. And the Human Relations Commission could say, You have been discriminated against. You now -- the City is ordered to provide the benefits. I mean, wouldn't that be the order? I mean, wouldn't the Human Relations Commission be ordering -- 336 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750
Now, since the Human Relations Commission, in my judgment, is the City, since all of them were appointed by the Mayor, if the City decided not to appeal, who would have standing to appeal?
In that case, Mr. President, the parties that had filed the complaint, obviously, would have obtained the relief they sought. The City, as the employer, would obviously have standing to appeal. And if the City elects not to appeal, because you're dealing with a specific complaint at that point and not a challenge to the bill in its entirety, there would be no one else to have standing to appeal in that situation.
That's right. So that, one-at-a-time heterosexual couples could try to get the benefits, I guess the Personnel Department would deny them the benefits, they take an appeal to the Human Relations Commission. The 337 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 Human Relations Commission could just grant them the benefits one at a time, and there's never anybody to appeal it. So if it's 10, 50, 100 -- so is it -- I mean, it just seems to me that there is a basic internal inconsistency in the bill when you say, We are only going to apply -- we are going to provide life partnership rights to same-sex couples at the same time you amend the provision in the bill which makes it illegal to discriminate against all of the other people who might want to have those benefits, and the only people who can say yea or nay is the Human Relations Commission, right, the Executive Director of which came here and testified in favor of the bills and has also said he essentially would like -- as a lot of other people did -- said that the bills should be broadened to include heterosexual couples. It seems to me that if this bill is passed, in advance, we know, based on your opinion and your testimony, right -- I mean, this is a bill that, in effect, is providing domestic partnership rights to same-sex as well as heterosexual couples, which might not offend some 338 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 people. You know, I mean, people could be all over the lot on it, but I think it's a serious, serious concern that we ought to have about what is the scope of the action that is being considered here.
Mr. President, if I might, I do think it's fair to point out that while -- while this appears to be an internal inconsistency, it may be possible to cure that with regard to the Human Relations Commission by amendment to the legislation. It would not obviate potential equal protection claims or potential Title 7 claims in the courts. But to the extent that there is a concern with regard to the Human Relations Commission, it may be possible to cure that with an amendment to the legislation.
Well, maybe, maybe, I don't know. I mean. That's really not my issue. My concern is that on the face of it, it appears that this bill is providing for one set of actions, but the reality is, we don't know what 339 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 could happen as a result of the passage of this bill. I mean, we could be in a position where any number of different couples -- well, let me pose this hypothetical. We aren't -- if this bill passes, the City is not going to be able to discriminate on the basis of marital status, is that correct?
Marital status. Suppose there was a person who had wanted to have more than one wife, and he says, I want to put this other person on my benefits, and I think I ought to be able to because to not let me do it is discriminating on the basis of marital status. Back to marital status. And I don't want to be discriminated on the basis of marital status. I mean, what happens?
The hypothetical is 340 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 -- the hypothetical is that you can't discriminate on the basis of marital status in any way, shape, or form.
A person comes and says, I want to have two spouses on the benefits. Is there any issue about whether or not there is discrimination on the basis of marital status? I just want to know how far it is we are opening up the door to potential challenges and to concerns about what is happening here.
Mr. President, I understand your concern. I think the hypothetical is somewhat problematic. I think the Law Department would advise that there's no problem there because it's illegal to have more than one spouse. (Applause.)
Well -- well, you know, that's real easy to say, but I have a spouse and I want a domestic partner. I'm only asking. All you have to do is say it's not a problem. And if it isn't a problem, it isn't a problem.
If your question 341 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 is whether or not the City, as an employer, can extend benefits to life partners, then I believe that the answer to that question is yes. And under that circumstance, the individual presumably would not have a basis for claiming discrimination on the basis of marital status. If -- if your question goes to particular employment practices, beyond the extension of benefits, I think what you are concerned about are the types of claims that an individual may make because --
That's not what I'm concerned about. I'll get to that later.
I do have that concern, but I'm not going to yield -- I'm not going to take up all the time like this. I'll recognize Councilman Kenney at this point.
Thank you, Mr. President. As was testified to earlier, before you got here, the Personnel Director indicated that 342 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 there were opportunities for heterosexual couples outside the traditional route of marriage, i.e., religious or civil ceremony or simply the obtaining of a marriage license, that the option that those heterosexual couples also had was a simple declaration notarized and filed with the Personnel Office that they were in fact common-law spouse, and that that would enable those individuals to obtain the full range of benefits that any other married person under the City employ would have an opportunity to gain. Is the hypothetical or the situation that the Council President raised relative to two unmarried heterosexual persons; one, a city employee?
Claiming discrimination based on the Fair Practices Act that we are going to amend, could be cured by a simple registration and declaration of the partnership, which is available to them now. For example, if -- would you need to go to the Human Relations Commission or to the courts if the remedy -- if the remedy for that situation 343 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 was a simple notarized statement of commitment, which is what exists now for heterosexual unmarried couples?
Councilman Kenney, I will try to answer your question. There is a distinction between unmarried heterosexual couples that are legally common-law spouses and unmarried heterosexual couples that are not. So that not all unmarried heterosexual couples that cohabitate are common-law spouses. So there is a distinction in terms of that universe. If your question is whether or not some of the concerns with regard to the definition of "life partner" could be cured by some kind of verification process, the idea simply being, with marriage, you're issued a certificate of marriage, someone can check the relationship, when it started, when it ended, to ensure there's no abuse or fraud. The same with common-law spouses. They can get a certificate through personnel. You can verify the relationship. They have to provide proof that there is a relationship, and that 344 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 they're cohabiting and are financially interdependent.
Similar to what's being asked for in the registration process --
Correct. So I believe that the answer to your question generally is yes. And certain of the amendments, I understand, that are at least under discussion currently would address that issue in terms of simply verifying for the City's purposes to ensure that what you have is a mutually committed couple. While they may have philosophically elected not to hold themselves out as being married or have elected not to marry, they may be financially interdependent, they may be cohabiting, so in order to make sure that there's a legitimate relationship, you have a process.
Does the court take into consideration the need to impose a remedy when there are no other options for the people who 345 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 are making the complaint? For example, is a potential remedy for the hypothetical that the president raised relative to being excluded from participating in these benefits, would a remedy be that they simply register with the Personnel Department that they have a committed relationship, that they share a bank account and car and house; and, in effect, are common-law husband and wife?
The short answer to your question really is no. 13 The definition of "common-law spouse," under Pennsylvania law is a marriage by the express agreement of the parties, without ceremony and almost invariably without a witness, by words uttered with a view and for the purpose of establishing the relationship for husband and wife.
As I started out, not all unmarried heterosexual couples would, A, choose to hold themselves out as being married and so, therefore, they wouldn't qualify as being 346 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 common-law spouses. Common-law spouses for purposes of our discussion are treated as spouses. So, yes, there are certain individuals that would fall into that category, but not all. And so because the definition of "life partner" is limited to same-sex couples, you still have that universe of individuals that they could not simply sign up with the Personnel Department using that affidavit. And they would not be included for purposes of this legislation and the extension into that.
But on the face of their relationship, life partners and common-law spouses are the same, by virtue of their relationship. They're a sharing, committed, economically-related, interrelated relationship. Why would an individual who refuses to acknowledge all of those factors in their relationship even need to be considered as domestic partners unless they really were? I mean, you have to cohabitate in the same residence, you have to share the day-to-day toils of life, you have to have shared bank 347 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 accounts and other types of things, you have to buy your groceries together. I mean, it's as ridiculous as two people living in two separate cities saying, Well, we're domestic partners. No, you're not. We don't live together, we don't do all the things that common-law spouses or domestic partners do. Now, you can argue that. But on the face of that, the court would say, Well, yeah, you really are domestic partners, even though you don't share any of those issues, you don't live together. I mean, basically, life partner and common-law spouse are basically the same.
Unfortunately, Councilman Kenney, they are not. Under Pennsylvania law -- and the real core of it here is State law -- the definition of "marriage" is very simple. It is a civil contract by which one man and one woman take each other for husband and wife. It's a statutory definition. Under Pennsylvania law, common-law spouses, it's the same, the distinction being that you have a union by ceremony and a union without 348 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 ceremony by express words of the parties holding themselves out as being married. If the definition of "life partner" is limited to same-sex couples, then you still have a universe of unmarried heterosexual couples that do not fall within the category of common-law spouses who --
Miss Suber, can we talk a little bit about dependents of partners. It is my understanding that if the bill, as amended, were passed, that the dependents of any of the partners that were eligible for coverage under the bill, those dependents would also be covered. So that if a male City employee had a domestic partner and that domestic partner had dependents, those dependents would now be covered; is that correct?
Mr. President, it is my understanding that is the intent. I believe 349 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 that is, in fact, correct. It might be more appropriate for the Personnel Director to respond to the question.
To make sure that I understand your question, your question is, would dependents of a --
If I'm a City employee, and I'm single, and I put Councilman Nutter on my benefits, and he's got five children, right, and those five children don't have any coverage or anything, he comes on, the children come on; is that correct?
Just for the record. I knew you were going to have something for that record.
All right. I just thought it would be an interesting hypothetical to brighten up what's going to be a long night. 350 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750
Miss Seyda, I don't want you to say "in most cases." I want you to tell me what happens under the bill. An employee gets a domestic partner, that domestic partner has a bunch of kids. If the domestic partner goes on the benefits and the children, the dependents go on, I don't want to say "the children," 'cause it could be -- my understanding is it could be dependents other than just minor children, the dependents go on.
Dependents would be covered in the same way that they would be covered if it was a spouse.
All right. Now, is that what happens in private industry? Does anybody know what happens in private industry if the dependents -- if the life partner, not employee, has children, it is my understanding, and I'm not even sure where I got this from. It is my understanding that those children would be eligible for coverage but there would be a payment that would have to be made in order to get those 351 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 children coverage.
Well, it would depend upon the plan. I mean, it conceivably -- it could -- in a City-administered plan, there could be an additional cost involved too. It depends upon if the --
You mean to tell me if this bill passed and a life partner has dependents in one of our -- in our City-administered, in order for those dependents to be covered, there would be a premium that would have to be paid by the employee? Which one of our plans is that?
It would be -- the City's Blue Cross PPO Plan does have an employee contribution, and the employee would be responsible for paying whatever critics would apply in a marriage situation. The same rules -- the same rules would apply for a domestic-partner relationship as would apply to a marriage relationship.
And I just want to make sure I understand this. So that you could have -- we set up a situation where the City 352 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 employee has a domestic partner, that partner has children, whether or not there is anything -- any premium has to be paid or not, those dependents and children are covered. But under the amendment, in 61 days, they could all be off. It just takes 61 days to terminate a domestic partnership under the proposed amendment, is that correct? In 61 days?
Under the proposed amendment to the bill, it takes 61 days in order for a City employee to eliminate -- to change domestic partners or life partners, is that correct?
The proposed amendment was 60 days to terminate a relationship, yes.
So in 60 days, the relationship could be terminated, that life partner could be off, the dependents, the children of that life partner could be off. And then when could another life partner be put on the benefits, the next day?
No. I believe in the proposal, there is a waiting period, I believe 353 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 it's --
I believe the waiting period is one year, Mr. President.
So that under the proposed amendment, you could only have one domestic partner in any one year? Councilman Nutter, does anybody know? Is that the amendment?
It's proposed amendment number 2, number 2 under the definition under the definition of life partnership, Section 13 A, small Roman numeral iv, if they have not been a member of a different life partnership for the past 12 months, parentheses, unless the prior life partnership ended as a result of the death of the other life partner. Otherwise, there is a one-year waiting period, and also there is a requirement of at least a six-month proof of interdependence.
Is the six months added to the year, or can that be included within the year?
It's within the year. But you do have to wait a year. 354 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750
So now how does that work? When the life partner is no longer covered the dependents are no longer covered?
Is it possible -- is it possible for -- is it possible for life partners -- well, no, I'll save that question. I see Councilman Kenney's light's on. Councilman Kenney.
I'd like to follow up on that line of questioning with two additional hypotheticals. An individual single person, heterosexual male, enters into a common-law registration process with a heterosexual female with four children, not his. Those children are covered by his employee plan? He is the employee.
If it's a common-law relationship, it is a marriage relationship, and the answer would be yes.
Yes. And if they absolve that relationship through divorce, those children are off, because they're not his kids. 355 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750
I would. . . I would defer to somebody who has a little more familiarity with family law than I do.
No, a single man enters into a common-law registration with a woman who has four children, none of them are his. They are on his health benefits as a City employee.
If that relationship absolved or dissolved by divorce, through divorce, those children are then off.
An additional situation, if an individual enters into a common-law registration relationship with an individual who's a heterosexual female, and the male is the employ, and they produce four children in that relationship, and then they divorce, those four children stay on, correct? They're his kids. 356 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 It would be --
That's dependent upon what the agreement was in the divorce in terms of which parent has responsibility for the medical coverage for the children would be. . .
No, not at all a custody in terms of who was legally responsible for providing those benefits.
In the first situation, where they're not his children, they came, they were existing before a common-law marriage. They are off.
They would be off because they were not his children before, they're not his children now.
If they are his children, dependent upon the agreement in the divorce, they could be on or off.
That is correct. 357 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750
If he enters into another common-law relationship and had three more children and then dissolves that relationship, they could be on or off. I mean, basically, my point is, from a common law perspective and from a marriage perspective, we could go on hypothetical to a 20- or 25-children dependency on the City health benefits and other issues legally, as we stand now.
Well, the same rules apply for domestic partnership relationships as apply in a marriage relationship.
But in a same-sex domestic partnership relationship, you might only have one set of kids; you're not going to produce, unless something changed in biology that I don't know about. In that domestic partnership, even if there were existing children from another heterosexual relationship, that same-sex 358 COUNCIL OF THE WHOLE - BILL NO.'S 970745, 970749, 970750 relationship is not going to produce any additional dependents.
We were qualifying that be reference to artificial insemination.